involves some kind of correlation or fit between what is said or thought, on one side, and what is or what is the case or the
Kahn writes, 'the pre-philosophicĬonception of truth in Greek. Question: what must reality be like for knowledge and informative discourse to be possible and for statements and beliefs of the form X is Y to be true?' ToĪsk what reality must be like for sentences to be true implies that truth in sentences is their being like what is. doctrines of Being first arose in Greece in connection with the this notion of what is as whatever distinguishes truth from falsehood. Thus the Greek concept of Being takes its Philosophical starting point: the veridical use of esti and on for 'the facts' that a true statement must convey. it was another use of to be that gave Parmenides and Plato their 'is the case,' or by some equivalent phrase.' He remarks that 'instead of existence. Philosophical treatment.' (1) Kahn also describes a so-called veridical use of the Greek 'be' according to which it 'must be translated by 'is true,' 'is so,' But he does not seem even to suspect that it is an act worthy of any special consideration, or that it is capable of He readilyĪdmits it in Being per accidens. Joseph Owens observes, 'Aristotle does not for an instant deny existence. Oblivious of the difference between what a thing is and its existence. There is no concept of existence as such.' This is not to say that Aristotle, for instance, is Ti, being something or other, being something definite. What something is, the factor of existing, if it appears at all, appears secondary and of no distinct significance. In their view to be is to be a definite kind of thing.' In contrast to 'Both of them,' he writes of Plato and Aristotle, 'systematically subordinate the notion ofĮxistence to predication, and both tend to express the former by means of the latter. Insignificance of the difference between existing and not existing. In a study of the Greek verb 'be' ( einai), Charles Kahn shows the priority of its use as a predicating copula and the corresponding
To be is spoken in many ways, but for Aristotle 'it is obvious that of these the what-something-is, which signifies the substance, is theįirst' (1028a). There is, however, reason to think it is an originally meaningless accident of Heidegger remarks that 'in ontological problematic, being and truth have from time immemorial been brought together if not entirely Subordinates the being (the existence and identity) of signs (linguistic or otherwise) to the natural, physical, finally given presence of the non-signs they Third feature of classical truth: the secondary and derivative character of the signs by which truth is symbolized and communicated. It is up to us to copy Nature's originals, whose identity and existence are determined by causes prior to and independent of local convention.
ToĪccommodate the priority of nature, however, truth has to be a secondary sort of sameness: according to the classical metaphor, the imitation of original byĬopy. To be true, what you think separated must be what is separated-that is, they must be the same (the same form or eidos). Says, 'he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to the objects Second, the idea that truth is a kind of sameness, falsity a difference, between what is said and what there is. There exists a what which is there, present, with an identity, form, or nature of its own. One can say of what is that it is just in case Unobjectionable assumptions, assumptions which prove decisive for the career of truth in philosophy.įirst, the priority of nature over language, culture, or the effects of historical experience. The formula synthesizes three distinct and in no way obvious or "Aristotle defines truth for classical philosophy: 'to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.' ( Metaphysics 1011b) This seems simple, but it is important to see that it is not.
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